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Abstract
Three experiments investigated the hypothesis that definite singular generics (e.g., the
dog has four legs) require that the kind does not contain multiple subkinds. In experiment 1, we
asked native English speakers to judge the naturalness of generics depending on whether a kind
has no subkinds or multiple subkinds. Experiment 1 found that there was no interaction
between subkinds and generics depending on the presence of subkinds. However, we found
that there were main effects of generics and domain. The participants thought that bare plurals
sound more natural than indefinite and definite singulars. Also, participants thought generic
statements which describe artifacts sound more natural than those which describe animals. In
experiment 2, novel animals and artifact kinds were described using three generics forms and
then participants were asked how many subkinds belong to a kind. There was a marginal effect
of generics; people thought there were fewer subkinds when the kind was described by definite
singulars compared to when the kind was described by bare plurals or indefinite singulars. In
experiment 3, participants were asked to match a description about a category given via one of
three generic forms with a picture that suggested the kind had no subkinds or one that
suggested the kind had multiple subkinds. No effect of generic form was found. We discuss the
role of subkinds on the interpretation of definite singulars.
Keywords: generics, cognitive psychology
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Using Categories in Our Lives
We naturally put things into categories. It would be very hard and inefficient if we had
to think and speak of each as a unique thing rather than as a member of a category.
Fortunately, our conceptual mechanisms allow us to identify things as members of categories.
This allows us to think and talk about things without needing much information about our
environment (Cimpian, 2016), and helps us store and retrieve information efficiently
(Markman, 1989).
Though we could form categories such as THINGS THAT ARE WHITE which would include
things such as white bears, white balls, white paper, white rice, and white birds, these types of
categories are relatively arbitrary. We do not naturally classify into arbitrary classes (e.g., white
things, sharp things and curved things), but instead, we naturally categorize things based on
kinds (e.g., DOG, TABLE, BIRD) (Markman, 1989). Kind representations are the representations
of categories that have rich correlational and causal structure. For example, members of a kind
such as BIRD share many correlated features (e.g., having feathers, fly, and having a beak) and
display a rich causal structure (Markman, 1989).
Thinking and Talking about Categories
We use kind representations not only to think and talk about the members of a kind, we
also think and talk about kinds themselves. There are two mechanisms when we think and talk
about a kind. First of all, when we encounter an entity, we generally think of it as a specific
instance of a kind (e.g., a dog, a bird, and a chair). These representations allow us to think or
speak of things as instances of kinds and can be linked to our perceptual representations of
those entities (Prasada & Dilligham, 2009). Furthermore, we also can think and talk about kinds
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as such. For example, when we think and talk about the idea that “dogs evolved from wolves”,
dogs does not refer to specific instances of the kind, but the kind itself. This mechanism cannot
be linked to perceptual representations, thus we can think about a kind, but we cannot
perceive it as we can instances of kinds (Gelman, 2003; Prasada & Dilligham, 2009; Waxman,
2004).
Kind representations have been observed in conceptual-linguistic system interfaces
(Gelman, 2003; Prasada, 2016), thus language is the most important tool to convey information
about kinds and express our thoughts about kinds. A large body of literature in psychology and
linguistics support the idea that generics, which are expressed in statements (1)-(3) below, are a
crucial form of expression for talking about and characterizing kinds (Gelman, 2003; Leslie,
2007; Prasada 2000, 2012; Prasada & Dillingham, 2006, 2009).
(1) Dogs are four-legged.
(2) A duck lays eggs.
(3) The dodo is extinct.
These statements express generalizations about kinds rather than individuals, episodes or
events (Carlson & Pelletier, 1995). Thus, they give us access to kinds as a whole (Gelman et al.,
2002; Hollander et al., 2002; Leslie, 2012; Prasada, 2000). Generics allow us to think and talk
about a category as a coherent and stable entity (Gelman, 2004). Thus, it is frequently observed
that native English speakers naturally use generics to refer to kinds (Gelman et al. 1998; Gelman
& Tardif, 1998). Given the centrality of conceptual mechanisms in common knowledge and
language, investigating linguistic processes in kind representations is a crucial task in theories of
conceptual representation.
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Kind representations are evident early in development. We acquire generics around
approximately 30 months of age (Gelman & Raman, 2003; Graham, Nayer & Gelman, 2011).
Children, even as young as preschool age, use generics to talk about kinds and properties that
belong to the category (Gelman at al., 1998). Children’s judgments on generics are similar to
adult’s judgments in many respects (Brandone, Gelman & Hedglen, 2015), and thus they
generally can understand generic statements appropriately (Gelmen, 2003; Gelman & Raman,
2003; Hollander et al., 2002). Three or four-year-old children can understand kind-based
inductive inferences. When children are presented with non-generalizable properties (e.g., is
cold) about a kind, they do not use generics (Gelman, 2004). Thus, these observations from
early in our lives suggest generics’ potential function as a tool to study kind representations and
help us understand our conceptual representations more generally.
Generics are different from quantified statements. Generics convey general
information, but they do not express quantity information about kinds or categories which
quantified statements do (Leslie & Lerner, 2016). For example, if we are asked “how many
ravens are black?”, then we can answer “all [or some, or most, etc.] ravens are black”, but we
cannot answer with the generic “ravens are black” (Carlson, 1977). Generics are also different
from adverbs of quantification statements (Lewis & Keenan, 1975) such as generally, usually, or
often. Even children by at least three years of age are able to discriminate generics from the
statements with quantifying determiners (e.g., some/all/most dogs wear collars) (Brandone,
Gelman & Hedglen, 2014; Hollander, Gelman & Star, 2002; Leslie & Gelman, 2012).
There are some challenges to analyze generics semantically (Leslie & Lerner, 2016).
First, “dogs have four legs” seems to be similar in meaning to “all dogs have four legs,” however
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we can easily find instances of dogs which do not have four legs because they had accidents.
Thus, generics allow counterexamples. Furthermore, “ducks lay eggs” or “lions have a mane”
are acceptable as generics, but they involve properties that are possessed by only the mature
members of one sex and thus involve less than half of the instances having the property (Leslie
2007, 2008). Finally, “ticks carry Lyme disease” or “sharks attack swimmers” can be interpreted
as generics, even though very few ticks or sharks (approximately one percent) have the
property. However, “humans are right-handed” or “books are paperbacks” are more likely to be
rejected as generics, even though a large percentage of instances of the kinds have that
property (Cimpian, Brandone & Gelman, 2010; Leslie 2007; Leslie & Lerner, 2016).
Thinking and Talking about Kinds in English
Generics can be produced with a wide variety of linguistic morphosyntactic indications,
such as the form of the verb, determiners (the), and contextual cues (Gelman, 2004; etc.).
However, the current research focuses on generic noun phrases. Generic noun phrases are
expressed at least with three syntactic forms in English, which are bare plurals noun phrases
(e.g. “Dogs have four legs.”), indefinite singulars noun phrases (e.g. “A dog has four legs.”), and
definite singulars noun phrases (e.g. “The dog has four legs.”) (Krifka, 2003; Lyons, 1977).
Even though we can express kinds with three types of generic noun phrases in English, a
significant number of studies concerning generics have focused primarily on bare plural
generics. Bare plural noun phrases can be acceptable as generics without any restrictions of
kinds and properties. However, unlike bare plural generics, singular generics cannot easily be
used as generics. Thus, it seems to have some requirements (or constraints) for singular
generics to be interpreted as generics. For example, indefinite singulars are acceptable as
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generics when they convey “necessary”, “essential” or “inherent” properties of the kind
(Lawler, 1973). According to Greenberg (2003) and Cohen (2001), indefinite singulars can be
generics when they carry rules and regulations.
Definite singular noun phrases have similar constraints like indefinite singulars, but they
are more likely to be infelicitous. According to Carslon (1977), the owl (i.e. definite singulars)
and owls (i.e. bare plurals) are similarly interpreted semantically.
a. The owl has two eyes in the front of its skull.
b. Owls have two eyes in the front of their skull.
However, Carlson (1977) also states that definite singulars can be infelicitous unless
they apply to well-established kinds. What a well-established kind is depends on an appropriate
body of background knowledge (Krifa et al., 1995). Definite statements of “The dinosaur is
extinct” or “The dodo is extinct” are acceptable because they are well known kinds (Leslie &
Lerner, 2016). Also, definite singulars are less likely to be interpreted as generics when a kind
connects to statistical or accidental properties (e.g. The car has a radio (Fuellenbach & Gelman,
2019)). However, when a kind is linked to principled properties, definite singular statements are
likely to be accepted as generics. For example, “The car has wheels” can be a generic because
having wheels is a principled property of a car (Prasada & Dillingham, 2006, 2009). These
observations of restrictions in using singulars as generics make it hard for us to analyze the
statements (Leslie & Lerner, 2016). There are few discussions about the acceptability of definite
singulars (e.g., Nunberg, & Pan (1975), Carlson (1977), and others), but definite singulars have
received less attention compared to indefinite singular and bare plural generics in psychology
and linguistic literatures.
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Additionally, definite singulars are less likely to be observed when people express
general information of kinds in their daily speech. Thus, bare plurals as kind-references
uniformly refer to kinds (Krifka, 2003), and it is more prominently observed to express general
information. The corpus study, conducted by Fullenbach and Gelman (2019), showed children
are most likely to use bare plurals as a tool to express a kind in their everyday lives.
Furthermore, other corpus studies have showed a remarkable general absence of definite
singulars while bare plurals are most favorable generic subjects (Brent & Siskind, 2001; Davis &
MacNeilage, 1995; Rollins, 2003; Brown, 1973; Sawyer, 1997; MacWhinney, 2000).
A natural question arises when definite singulars can be qualified for generics to convey
generalizations of categories. Consider the following sentences:
(4) The parabola is easy to draw.
(5) #The curve is easy to draw.
(4) can be acceptable as a generic statement, while (5) cannot be interpreted as generics. When
we think of the kind PARABOLA, we think its instances vary along a number of dimensions but
they are all the same kind of thing. However, when we think of the kind CURVE, we think it has
multiple kinds of curves in it (e.g. CIRCLE, ELLIPSE, PARABOLA), and thus its instances are not all
the same kind of thing. This observation is a starting point to build our theory that whether
definite singulars can be interpreted as generics depends on the presence or absence of
subkinds of the category named by the noun.
Then, what are subkinds? We have hierarchical structures of categories in our minds. In
the structure, kinds that are higher in the hierarchy are superordinate to the lower-level kinds,
while the lower-level kinds are subordinate to the higher-level kinds (Murphy & Lassaline,
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1997). Thus, the subordindate kinds are called subkinds. For example, DOG is a higher level in
the structure of categories than COLLIE or POODLE, therefore COLLIE or POODLE are subkinds
of DOG. Also, DOG can be a subkind of ANIMAL because DOG is subordinate to ANIMAL. Not all
subsets of a category count as a subkind. White dogs or big dogs, for instance, do not count as
subkinds of dogs (Prasada, Hennefield & Otap, 2012). Based on hierarchical relationship
between subkinds and kinds, subkinds are the representations of the more general and specific
categories (Prasada et al., 2012).
Given the relation between kinds and subkinds, does the presence of subkinds of a kind
guide the way we think and talk about a kind? If a natural kind or an artifact is introduced with
the fact either that it has no subkinds or that it has multiple subkinds, will the participants
consequently reason differently about the things? In more specific terms, can the presence of
subkinds have an effect on the acceptability of definite singulars generics? There are few direct
literature that investigates the role of subkinds on linguistic expression, and therefore the main
goal of the current research is to investigate whether the presence of subkinds affects the
acceptability of definite singulars noun phrases as generics.

Proposal
It is hypothesized that definite singulars are acceptable as generics when a kind has no
subkinds (i.e. instances are understood to be variants of the same kind), but less acceptable
when a kind is understood to have multiple subkinds. In order to investigate our hypothesis, we
conducted three experiments.
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In experiment 1, we asked native English speakers to answer whether three different
types of generics sentences, including bare plurals, indefinite singulars, and definite singulars,
sounded natural when a novel kind was introduced as either having no subkinds or that it had
multiple subkinds. We predicted that when a kind had no subkinds, participants would judge
definite singulars statements as sounding more natural than when a kind had multiple
subkinds. Bare plurals and indefinite singulars were not expected to be affected by variabilities
of subkinds. Furthermore, although it is not our main interest, we sought to determine the
domain-generality of generics by using animal and artifact kinds stimulus materials.
In experiment 2, we investigated whether English speakers thought that a novel kind
had no subkinds or multiple subkinds based on three different types of generics sentences. We
hypothesized that when a kind was described by definite singulars, participants would think
that the kind had no subkinds. However, when a kind is spoken about by bare plurals or
indefinite singulars, participants would be more likely to think that the kind had different
subkinds.
Experiment 3 investigated a similar phenomenon to that investigated in experiment 2
but with different stimulus materials and design.

Experiment 1
The primary purpose of experiment 1 was to investigate whether three different generic
noun phrases would be interpreted differently depending on the presence of subkinds. It was
hypothesized that native English speakers would think that definite singulars sounded natural
when a kind had no subkinds and thus the variation amongst instances of a kind was
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understood to be accidental and the kind was understood to all be the same kind of thing, but
not when the variation amongst instances of a kind was understood to be due to there being
instances of different subkinds of the kind. On the other hand, the naturalness of bare plurals
and indefinite singulars should not be affected by whether a kind varies in their subkinds or not.
Experiment 1 tested the hypothesis by asking participants to evaluate the naturalness of
statements such as (4)-(6), which characterized the kind.
(4) The dax is nocturnal.
(5) A dax is nocturnal.
(6) Daxes are nocturnal.
If a kind has no subkinds, participants would think (4) sounds natural. The naturalness of (5) and
(6) would not be affected by the presence of subkinds. The participants were given instructions
to make a generic interpretation rather than one which involved interpreting the sentence as
one instance of the kind. Furthermore, we presented 6 instances of pictures of a novel kind and
described its properties. Since we used novel kinds, we were able to manipulate whether
participants were told whether there were any subkinds or not.

Methods
Participants
The number of participants were 175 adults (above 18 years old). We recruited the
participants through Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk). An additional 147 participants were
tested, but we excluded them because they failed to perform catch questions (below 90
percent accuracy rate). Native English speakers and participants residing in the U.S. were
targeted to help limit the variability due to differences in the types of English spoken in other
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countries. Participation was restricted to workers with an approval rating of 95%. Participants
received monetary compensation for the participation.

Research design
The research design is a 2 x 3 x 2 within-subject design with 2 levels of sub-kinds
(Multiple sub-kinds vs. No sub-kinds), 3 levels of generics (bare plurals vs. indefinite singulars
vs. definite singulars) and 2 levels of domain (Animals vs. Artifacts). The naturalness of generic
statements was the dependent variable and was evaluated using a Likert-type 7-point scale.

Materials
The experimental stimuli included pictures of 4 novel animals and 4 novel artifacts with
6 variants (instances) of each presented against a white background that were created by
digitally modifying and combining pictures of parts of real animals and artifacts. For example,
daxes were created using turtle shells and the legs and heads of ladybugs (see below the
example). Each kind was described using three generic properties of a kind, such as habitat for
natural kinds (e.g., “daxes live in arid climates.) and function for artifact kinds (e.g. “wastorns
are used by engineers.”). Each kind was given a novel label (see Appendix E in experiment 1).
Daxes live in arid climates. They are nocturnal. Their average lifespan is 27 days.
Scientists have noted that daxes can vary in their appearance (see below). They think
this is because there are a number of different kinds of daxes. They don’t think this is
because there are a number of different kinds of daxes.
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Please rate how good or bad the following statement sounds as a statement about the
category described above.
a. The dax is nocturnal.
b. A dax is nocturnal.
c. Daxes are nocturnal.
1------------2-----------3-----------4-----------5-----------6-----------7
Very unnatural
Very natural

Procedure
This experiment was conducted via MTurk. In each version of the survey, participants
were randomly assigned to one of the versions. Participants were presented a description with
6 instances of kinds of pictures. The description specified that in an Earth-like planet, scientists
had discovered new animals (or new artifacts) and told about three properties of the kind via
generic statements (e.g., Daxes live in arid climates. They are nocturnal. Their average lifespan
is 27 days). Also, for a given item, a given participant was told either that the kind had no
subkinds (e.g., scientists do not think that there are a number of different kinds of daxes) or
multiple subkinds (e.g., scientists think that there are a number of different kinds of daxes). We
had two versions of the survey so that the same item appeared in the opposite condition in the
other version.
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While viewing the description with the pictures, participants were asked two catch
questions, which asked about a manifestly true or false property of the kind and tested whether
the participant paid attention to the task. Then the participants were asked to rate how natural
or unnatural three generic statements sounded as a statement about the category on a 7-point
Likert scale, with 1 indicating “Very unnatural” and 7 indicating “Very natural”.
To minimize the impression bare plural generics produced, the participants were
presented with indefinite singular generics (e.g., “a dax is nocturnal.”) and definite singular
generics (e.g., “the dax is nocturnal.”) arranged in a random order (counterbalancing the order:
indefinite singulars, definite singulars or definite singulars, indefinite singulars), and then finally
bare plurals (e.g., “daxes are nocturnal.”).
The task began with 2 practice trials with a novel animal and a novel artifact. Then the
participants performed 8 trials with 4 novel animals and 4 novel artifacts. The order of trials
was counterbalanced across the survey. The participants pressed the space bar in order to
answer the next question. Qualtrics was used to present the stimuli and record the data for all
the experiments reported in the current research.

Results
The central question of experiment 1 was whether definite singulars were judged to
sound better as generic statements when the kind was said not to have subkinds than when it
was described as having multiple subkinds. A 2 x 3 x 2 factorial within-subjects ANOVA was
performed with subkinds (multiple vs. single), generics (bare plurals vs. indefinite singulars vs.
definite singulars), and domain (animals vs. artifacts) as the independent variables and the
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rating of naturalness about generics as the dependent variable. We excluded the data of 147
participants with a below 90 percent accuracy rate on the catch questions.
There was a significant main effect of generics, F (2, 348) = 54.01, p < 0.01, η²= 1. Posthoc comparisons using Bonferroni showed that people thought about bare plurals (M = 6.42, SE
= 0.06) as sounding more natural than indefinite singulars (M = 5.98, SE = 0.08, p < 0.01) and
definite singulars (M = 5.65, SE = 0.09, p < 0.01). Moreover, people thought about indefinite
singulars as sounding more natural than definite singulars (p < 0.01). We also found that there
was a significant domain effect, F (1, 174) = 5.17, p = 0.02, η² = 0.62. People thought the
generics about artifacts (M = 6.06, SE = 0.06) as sounding more natural than animals (M = 5.98,
SE = 0.06). However, there was no significant effect of subkind, F (1, 174) = 0.107, p = 0.744,
η² = 0.062.
The main prediction was that there should be a significant interaction between subkinds
and generics. The ANOVA showed that this prediction was not confirmed, F (2, 348) = 0.015, p =
0.985, η² = 0.052. The non-significant interaction showed that the three differences of Multiple
– Single subkinds for Bare plurals (M = 0.002, SE = 0.001), indefinite singulars (M = -0.016, SE = 0.001), and definite singulars (M = -0.021, SD = 0.003) are not different from each other. Fig 1
shows the mean of naturalness of generics statements depending on the variability of subkinds.
Thus, the fact whether a kind varies in their subkinds did not lead definite singular statements
to be interpreted as generics.
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5
4
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Single

2
1
0
Bare plurals

Indefinite Singulars

Definite Singulars

Fig 1. Mean naturalness by form of the generics and number of subkinds.

Discussion
The result of experiment 1 did not provide evidence for the effect of presence of
subkinds on how natural definite singulars sound when referring to a kind. There were not any
differences between multiple subkinds and no subkinds in the naturalness of any of the three
forms of generic statements.
However, it could be premature to conclude that having no subkinds or multiple
subkinds does not have any impact on the judgement on the naturalness of generic uses of
definite singular statements. We showed the participants the novel kinds’ descriptions with the
pictures of instances of kinds. It is possible that the different appearances of the instances in
the pictures might mislead the participants to think that all kinds have different subkinds, even
though we told them whether there are multiple subkinds or no subkinds in the description we
presented. In order to avoid these possibilities, it may be useful for future experiments to use
only descriptions without any pictures of instances of kinds. Furthermore, it could be plausible
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that the participants already know that there are different subkinds of animals or artifacts
because of their experiences in their lives. Therefore, it might be hard for the participants to
think or assume that the novel kinds which we created do not have different subkinds of it.
Thus, we might still expect that there is a difference in how generics are produced depending
on the presence or absence of subkinds of a kind that can be detected with the right type of
experimental design.
Although domain was not our main interest, there was a significant effect of domain.
When the participants were presented with generic statements which describe artifacts, they
thought the generics sound more natural. However, Gelman et al. (2008) suggests that we can
use generics to express any content such as animals, artifacts, food, inanimate natural kinds,
and social categories. However, in daily usage, people are more likely to use generics when they
talk about animals than when they talk about artifacts (Gelman et al., 1998; Gelman & Tardif,
1998). It is not clear why people use generics more when referring to animals when there are
not any linguistic restrictions on the usages of generics when expressing contents. Given the
discussion on domain-generality in the previous literatures, we will not explore the domain
effect in the following experiments.

Experiment 2
The primary goal of the experiment 2 was to investigate whether native English
speakers would judge differently how many subkinds belong to a kind depending on the forms
of the generics used to talk about a kind. Participants were presented with 6 instances of
pictures of a novel kind which were used in experiment 1. Also, the participants were presented
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with a description that described 3 properties of the kind using only one of the forms of the
generic. Experiment 2 tested the prediction that when a kind was described by a definite
singular statement (e.g., the dax is nocturnal), people would think that the kind would have no
subkinds or fewer subkinds than when a kind was described by bare plurals (e.g., daxes are
nocturnal) and indefinite singulars (e.g., a dax is nocturnal), for which people would think that
the kind would have multiple subkinds.

Methods
Participants
We recruited 378 participants using MTurk, but 123 participants were excluded because
they performed below 90 percent accuracy rate on catch questions. Therefore, in experiment 2,
we used 255 participants’ data for analysis. The criteria of participants were equivalent with
Experiment 1 and none of participants in experiment1 were recruited.

Research Design
The research design is a one-way between-subject ANOVA with 3 levels of generic
sentences (bare plurals vs. indefinite singulars vs. definite singulars. The judgment of how many
subkinds belongs to a kind is the dependent variable.

Materials
On each trial, we presented a description along with statements about the category via
one of three generics forms – bare plurals, indefinite singulars, and definite singulars. The
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description was presented with the 6 instances of pictures of a kind as in Experiment 1 (see
Appendix E in experiment 2).
The dax lives in arid climates. It is nocturnal. Its average lifespan is 27 days. Scientists
have noted that the dax can vary in their appearance (see below).

Do you think there are different subkinds of daxes?
1------------2-----------3-----------4-----------5-----------6-----------7
No subkinds
Many subkinds

Procedure
The procedure was identical to that in experiment 1 with three modifications. First, to
minimized the effect of other generic forms, we randomly distributed the participants into 3
groups (bare plural, indefinite singulars, and definite singulars). Each group was presented with
a description of a kind using a single generic form. For instance, for definite singulars group, a
generic statement about the category was written only using definite singular generics (e.g., the
dax lives in arid climates). Second, the description of whether the kind varies in their subkinds
or not used in experiment 1 was not used in this experiment. Finally, the participants were
asked to rate how many subkinds belong to the kind using a 7-point Likert scale, with 1
indicating “No subkinds” and 7 indicating “Many subkinds”. The order of animal and artifact
trials was counterbalanced across subjects.
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Three outliers (±3SD) were removed when analyzing the data.

Results
In experiment 2, the main question was to investigate how many subkinds belong to the
kind when the kind was described by definite singular generic statements compared to when
the kind was described via the other generics. A one-way between-subject ANOVA was
performed. The main hypothesis was that there should be a significant effect of generics. The
ANOVA showed that there was a marginal effect of generics, F (2, 249) = 2.55, p = 0.08. Posthoc comparisons using Bonferroni (p = 0.017) showed that people thought that the kind has
fewer subkinds when it was spoken by definite singulars (M = 4.12, SE = 0.11), in comparison to
by bare plurals (M = 4.50, SE = 0.12) (See in Fig 2).

Mean of the number of subkinds

5
4.8
4.6
4.4
4.2
4
3.8
3.6
3.4
3.2
3
Bare plural

Indefinite singulars

Definite singulars

Fig 2. Mean number of subkinds by form of the generics.

Discussion
The results of experiment 2 provided marginal evidence for the effects of the presence
of subkinds on the interpretations for definite singulars. The marginal significance might be
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because the analysis was underpowered, thus the future experiments should increase more
sample sizes in order to avoid this possibility. The main effect of generics showed that the
participants were less likely to think that a kind has different subkinds when it was described by
definite singulars, compared to bare plurals and indefinite singulars.
Experiment 1 showed that there were not any differences in the naturalness of generics
as a function of whether we told participants whether a kind had subkinds or not. However,
experiment 2 showed that when we asked the participants to think about how many subkinds
belong to a kind, it was influenced by the types of generics used to describe the kind. This result
might show that the link between subkinds and kinds constrains our use of generics.
The results of experiment 2 contradict those of experiment 1. When people were asked
to judge the naturalness of generics, they did not show any differences among three types of
generics regardless of the variability of subkinds. However, when we asked the participants to
think how many subkinds belong to the kind, they thought that there are fewer subkinds of
kind when the kind was described by definite singulars.

Experiment 3
The central question of the current research was whether the presence or absence of
subkinds of a kind can be a factor which leads definite singulars to be accepted as generic
expressions when referring to a kind. To address this question, the experiment 3 investigated
whether native English speakers were more likely to match a definite singulars’ description
about a category to a kind that appeared to have no subkinds as opposed to a kind that
appeared to have multiple subkinds. Also, we explored if this preference would be greater for
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definite singulars than bare plurals and indefinite singulars. We hypothesized that people would
prefer pictures showing more variation when the description was bare plurals or indefinite
singulars. However, people would prefer pictures showing less variation when the description
was definite singulars.
In experiment 3, we presented 2 sets of pictures of novel kinds on each trial: the
pictures suggesting multiple subkinds and those suggesting no subkinds. For the multiple
subkinds pictures, we used the set of pictures used in experiment 1 and 2. Additionally, we
presented set of pictures that looked there were no subkinds because the instances varied only
in size and orientation (See Appendix E in experiment 3).

Methods
Participants
One-hundred twenty-six native English speakers were recruited through MTurk. The
criteria for participants were the same as for experiment 1 and 2 and none of participants who
participated in the previous experiments were recruited.

Research design
The research design is a one-way within-subject measures, with 3 levels of generic
sentences (bare plurals vs. indefinite singulars vs. definite singulars) as the independent
variable, and the set of pictures (no subkinds vs. multiple subkinds) as the dependent variable.
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Materials
Participants were presented with a set of 2 pictures of novel kinds of things and a
description of the kinds. One of set of pictures had items that were likely of different subkinds
(e.g. left frame below). Another set of pictures had items which were likely not to be of
different subkinds (e.g. right frame below). In addition to the pictures used in experiment 1 and
2 as suggesting different subkinds, we created the same number of pictures of novel animals
and artifacts in which the instances varied only in size and orientation (see Appendix E in
experiment 3).

The dax lives in arid climates. Its average lifespan is 27 days. The dax is nocturnal.

Which picture does the description go with?
1------------2-----------3-----------4-----------5-----------6-----------7
Definitely Left
Definitely Right
To prevent the possibility that properties in the description may be more naturally
associated with one of the pictures, we carefully chose the descriptions we used about the
category. For instance, we did not use “Bunons eat nuts,” as such a property might lead
participants to choose the pictures of the kind which looks like squirrels.
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Procedure
Experiment 3 has two parts to it. In the first part of the experiment, in the first page on
each trial, participants were presented to the description which talked about a category. Then,
in the second and third pages, the participants were presented with catch questions (true/false
judgment) in order to know whether participants were focused on the task. Next, we presented
the question “Which pictures is more likely to be a picture of NAME (e.g., daxes) of the category
in the fourth page. Finally, they were shown a set of 2 pictures, one suggesting different
subkinds and another suggesting no subkinds and asked to answer the question. Across trials,
the descriptions varied whether the items were referred to by bare plural, indefinite singular, or
definite singular generics.
Even though we carefully created pictures to suggest multiple subkinds or no subkinds,
there is the possibility that participants did not see them that way. Therefore, in part 2 of
experiment, we asked them to indicate which of the 2 pictures is a picture of a kind that has
multiple subkinds. Based on the answers of part 2 task, we denoted the multiple subkinds
stimuli as point 1 and the no subkinds stimuli as point 0 when analyzing the part 1 data. The
order of trials was counterbalanced.

Results
A one-way within-subjects ANOVA showed that there were no significant differences
among generic statements (F (2, 250) = 0.068, p = 0.93). Thus, the averages of three different
types of generics showed all were close to 0.5 (Bare plural = 0.50, Indefinite singulars = 0.51,
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Definite singulars = 0.51). The accuracy of performance for part 2 in experiment 3 showed
38.9%.

Discussion
In experiment 3, we asked the participants to choose which pictures matched with a
description of a kind given in terms of one of the forms of generic sentences. There are several
possibilities why experiment 3 did not show any difference based on the generic used. Even
though we carefully created the stimuli, it might not be clear to the participants. We expected
that the results of part 2 would show 100% accuracy, however the results showed only 38.9%
accuracy. Indeed, 49 participants (n=126) wrongly answered at least one set of pictures which
was supposed to be either suggesting multiple subkinds or no subkinds. The pictures that we
created may have caused the participants to be misled about the kinds.
Additionally, unlike experiment 2, we used a within-subject design for experiment 3,
therefore the participants read all 3 types of generic statements. It is possible that the bare
plural and indefinite singulars generic statements produced a biased impression regarding
subkinds. To avoid this possibility, it might be better to have a between-subject research design
in future research.

General Discussion
We investigated whether definite singulars can be used to refer to kinds when there are
no subkinds of a kind. Based on the results of experiment 1, we do not find evidence for this
hypothesis. However, we also investigated whether the converse relationship holds. In
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experiment 2, when we asked the participants to think how many subkinds belong to the kind,
they answered there were fewer subkinds when the kind was described by a definite singular
statement than when it was described by other generic statements. This result suggests that
our hypothesis is correct, and further suggests one way to conduct future research on the
effect of the presence of subkinds on thinking and talking about kinds.
There are many possibilities for why experiments 1 and 3 did not support our
hypothesis. First, even though we carefully created the pictures, when we asked the
participants to judge whether the pictures used in experiment 3 suggested kinds that have
multiple subkinds or no subkinds, they were correct only 38.9% of the time. As such, the
pictures might have misled the participants into having wrong perceptions about the kinds. In
order to avoid this possibility, future experiments should evaluate the stimuli before conducting
experiments. Also, it might be better to conduct the experiments without pictures of kinds
when people judge the naturalness of generics with novel kinds.
Another possibility could be the lack of significant results was caused by the online
survey’s environment. Even though there are a lot of benefits of online surveys such as ease of
distribution and ease of data collection, we had to rely on the participants taking the task
seriously without any supervision. We expected the participants to take time to think about
kinds based on all the information we presented. However, most participants finished the
experiment in less than 5 minutes. Also, we asked them to read the instructions thoroughly. If
the participants did not read the instructions carefully, their answers could be biased. The large
number of participants had to be excluded because they did not meet criteria on the catch
questions suggesting they may not have paid attention, or rushed through the tasks.
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Previous literature (Brent & Siskind, 2001; Brown, 1973; Davis & MacNeilage, 1995;
Fullenbach &Gelman, 2019; Leslie, 2016; Rollins, 2003; Sawyer, 1997; MacWhinney, 2000)
suggests that definite singulars are less often used and are more likely to be judged to be
infelicitous compared to bare plurals and indefinite singulars. We found a similar result in
experiment 1 where native English speakers thought that bare plural generic statements
sounded more natural compared to indefinite singulars and definite singulars. Given this,
participants may not consider the differences of the kinds in terms of the presence of subkinds
when they judged the naturalness of statements. This is because the definite singulars already
sound less natural when referring to the kinds. Indeed, a large body of literature in psychology
suggests that the usages of singular forms of generics are much more restricted than those of
bare plurals (e.g., Cohen, 2001; Leslie & Lerner, 2016, etc). Also, definite singulars are much
harder to interpret as generics than indefinite singulars. According to Cimpian et al. (2011),
children understood indefinite singulars but not definite singulars as generics. When children
were asked questions such as “what is the color of a strawberry” they were more likely to say
“red” than when they were asked questions such as “what is the color of the strawberry”.
Children are more likely to interpret generically when indefinite singulars refer to a kind rather
than when definite singulars do. The bias against interpreting definite singulars as generics may
be so strong that it might be difficult for the participants to discriminate the naturalness of
sentences between subkinds versus the absence of subkinds.
It is also possible that the participants could be biased by their background knowledge.
Even though we used novel kinds of animal kinds and artifacts, the participants already knew
that there were multiple subkinds of animal and artifact kinds based on their experiences.
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Previous studies (e.g., Cimpian et al., 2010; Cimpian & Markman, 2008) suggest that people’s
background knowledge can be useful in determining whether a sentence refers to a category.
For example, people can think “The cow is soft-hoofed” as generic sentence because “softhoofed” can characterize an entire animal kind. However, “The cow is sick” is more likely to be
rejected as generics, because people understand “being sick” as a temporary property, not a
natural property of cows. Even 3-year-olds can use their background knowledge when they
interpret a sentence as generic versus non-generic (Cimpian & Markman, 2008). Thus, the
participants in the current research may have found it hard to think that the novel kinds had no
subkinds due to these integrations of their background knowledge into the interpretations of
sentences.
Furthermore, according to Carlson (1977), well-established kinds are less infelicitous
when they are expressed by definite singulars. In the present experiment, we introduced novel
natural kinds and artifact kinds, and it could be better to have kinds which are familiar to
participants.
Even though the effect of domain was not our main concern in the present experiments,
we found that there was a significant effect in experiment 1. The result showed that native
English speakers thought that generic statements sounded more natural when referring to an
artifact kind than when referring to a natural kind. This is an interesting result because a lot of
previous studies suggested that people were more likely to use generics when they referred to
animal kinds rather than artifact kinds (e.g., Brandone & Gelman, 2013).
Finally, we should consider the possibility that our hypothesis may be wrong. It could be
possible that the presence of subkinds is not a factor that constrains when we can talk about
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kinds via definite singulars. Instead, other factors may be more important when we think and
talk about kinds. Recent literature has focused on the relationship between kinds and
properties (Gelman at al. 2008, Prasada & Dillingham, 2006, 2009). For example, when we use
indefinite singulars, we are restricted to talking about properties that have a principled link to a
kind. Compare “a dog has four legs” and “#a dog wears a collar.” The second sentence cannot
be interpreted as a generic because wearing a collar is a statistical or accidental property of
dogs. In future research, we need to investigate other factors that can have an effect on the
interpretation of definite singulars as generics.
In the present study, we investigated whether using definite singulars as generics was
constrained by whether the kind had subkinds or not. In future research, we need to address
the methodological issues discussed above by simplifying the design to investigate the role of
subkinds-kinds links in licensing definite singular generics.
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Appendix A
Experiment 1 Informed Consent
You are invited to participate in a research study. Participants must be over 18 years of
age. As this study pertains to the use of American English, participants must be native English
language speakers. Participants must also reside in the United States. The purpose of the
research study is to investigate how we think and talk about new categories of things. The
results of this study may help increase generalizable knowledge concerning the factors that
govern the interpretation of language and may impact automatic translation algorithms, as well
as how second languages are taught.
If you agree to participate, we will ask you to participate in an online experiment in
which you will be shown some pictures of novel things and told some information about them
and then asked to make some judgments either about the things or different ways of talking
about them. The time commitment of each participant is expected to be about 15 minutes.
Compensation in the amount of $0.75 will be credited to your MTurk account following
completion of the online survey and subsequent review by the research team, typically within
one day of the date of participation. While you may choose to withdraw from participation in
this study at any point, compensation will be awarded for completed surveys only.
Participation in this study may involve certain minimal risks such as breach of
confidentiality. Mechanical Turk is a web-based service, and so it is inherently subject to
possible security breaches. To minimize the risk of breach of confidentiality, your data will be
stored with a number that is not linked to your name. Your participation in this study may
involve boredom from answering many questions. To minimize the risk of boredom we have
kept the experiment short.
The data obtained from you will be collected via computer. This online survey was
generated via Qualtrics. The Qualtrics server will not collect IP addresses or identifying
information but will collect and store survey responses throughout the duration of the study.
Following data collection, the collected data will be exported and stored in encrypted files on
password protected computers in the Principal Investigator’s laboratory. This data will be
deleted from the Qualtrics server at the completion of the study. Data will remain stored in
backup files by the Qualtrics server for 90 days following the date of deletion, at which point it
will be permanently deleted. IP addresses will be collected by Amazon in accordance with
Amazon’s privacy notice as stipulated upon registering as a participant on Mechanical. As this
research is intended for publication, de-identified data will be stored for a minimum of three
years after the study is complete and might be published in conjunction with the findings of the
research team. If the de-identified data is published along with the journal article, it will be
available via the journal to other researchers for future use. If the findings are not published
along with an article in scientific journal three years after the completion of the study, the data
will be deleted.
Your participation in this research is voluntary. You may withdrawal from participation
in this study at any point, however compensation will only be granted upon the completion of
the survey. If you have any questions, you can contact the Principal Investigator, Sandeep
Prasada, 212-772-5677, sprasada@hunter.cuny.edu. If you have questions about your rights as
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a research participant, or you have comments or concerns that you would like to discuss with
someone other than the researchers, please email the CUNY Research Compliance
Administrator at hrpp@cuny.edu or 646-664-8918.
Statement of Consent:
“I have read the above description of this research and I understand it. I have been informed of
the risks and benefits involved, and all my questions have been answered to my satisfaction.
Furthermore, I have been assured that any future questions that I may have will also be
answered by the principal investigator of the research study. I voluntarily agree to participate in
this study. By consenting to participate in the study, I also agree to have my de-identified data
published along with the results of the study in a scientific journal.
By clicking yes I have not waived any of my legal rights to which I would otherwise be
entitled.
Yes, I give informed consent
No, I do not give consent
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Appendix B
Experiment 1 Instructions
In this experiment, you will be told about discoveries of animals and artifacts that
scientists have made on an earth-like planet. On each trial, you will be shown some pictures of
instances of the newly discovered category and told some facts that have been learned about
the category. Please read these facts carefully as you will have to answer questions based on
them.
On each trial, you will receive two statements concerning the newly discovered animal
or artifact. We would like you to read the statements and make a judgment whether these
facts are true or false.
The scientists are preparing to write about these newly discovered kinds of things. To
make the writing and reading more interesting, they would like to mix up the way they refer to
the categories so that they are not always using the same expressions over and over.
So, after you make the true-false judgments, you will be presented three sentences
which they may use to talk about the category. We would like you to read the sentence to
yourself and provide a judgment of how good or natural it sounds as a statement about the
category.
If the statement sounds very good or natural as a statement about the category, choose
7. If the statement sounds very bad or unnatural as a statement about the category, choose
1. Use the numbers in between to reflect varying levels of goodness or naturalness.
Please make each judgment on its own. The same form may sometimes sound more or
less good or natural for making a statement about a category. Please do not come up with a
strategy for responding. There are many factors that make a sentence sound better or worse
as a category description, so please just provide your gut reaction to the category description
on each trial. It is likely that in many cases there will be small differences between how good or
natural the different expressions sound as statements about the category. Please reflect these
differences in your ratings.
In many cases, the statement may also be interpreted in a way in which it is not making
a statement regarding the category. Please ignore these other interpretations. We are
interested ONLY in how good the statement sounds as a statement about the category.
After you answer the question, you can move to the next question by pressing
the SPACE BAR. Please press SPACE BAR when you are ready to begin the practice trials.
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Appendix C
Experiment 2 Instructions and Experiment 3 for part 1 Instructions
In this experiment, you will be told about discoveries of various types of animals and
artifacts that scientists have made on an earth-like planet. On each trial, you will be shown
some pictures of instances of the newly discovered category and told some facts that have
been learned about the category. Please read these facts carefully as you will have to answer
questions based on them.
On each trial, you will receive two statements concerning the newly discovered animal
or artifact. We would like you to read the statements and make a judgment whether these
facts are true or false.
After you make the true-false judgments, you will be asked to make a judgment about
whether you think there are different subkinds of the newly discovered category or whether
you think the newly discovered category does not have any subkinds. Please keep in mind that
subkinds (for example collies or dachshunds are subkinds of the kind dog) differ in systematic
ways from one another. Not any difference is the basis of a subkind. So, for example, brown
dogs or big dogs do not count as subkinds of dogs, but collies, german sheperds, and golden
retrievers are subkinds of the kind dog.
If you think there are likely many subkinds within the newly discovered category, choose
7. If you think there are likely no subkinds within the newly discovered category, choose 1. Use
the numbers in between to reflect varying levels of likelihood of there being subkinds within
the category.
Please make each judgment on its own. Please do not come up with a strategy for
responding. There are many factors that likely enter into making this type of judgment, so
please just provide your gut reaction concerning whether or not the newly discovered category
has subkind or not on each trial.
After you answer the question, you can move to the next question by pressing
the SPACE BAR. Please press SPACE BAR when you are ready to begin the practice trials.
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Appendix D
Experiment 3 Instructions for part 2
In this part of the experiment, you will be shown pairs of pictures and asked to indicate
which of the two pictures has items from multiple subkinds of the kind pictured?
If you are certain that the picture on the right has items from multiple subkinds of the
kind pictured, choose 7.
If you are certain that the picture on the left has items from multiple subkinds of the kind
pictured, choose 1.
Use the numbers in between to reflect varying levels of certainty that the picture on the left or
right has items from multiple subkinds of the kind pictured.
Please make each judgment on its own. Please do not come up with a strategy for
responding. There are many factors that likely influence making this type of judgment, so
please just provide your gut reaction as to whether the description goes with the picture on the
left or right on each trial.
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Appendix E
Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 Items
We used the set of pictures of items which represent multiple subkinds of a kind
through the entire experiments. For experiment 3, we added another set of pictures of items
which are examples of having no subkinds. There are 2 practices before the participants
perform the task.
The stimuli of experiment 1 was identical to that in experiment 2 with three
modifications. First, since the experiment 2 had between-subjects design, the participants were
presented with the descriptions written by only one of the generic forms. Secondly, the
description of whether the kind varies in their subkinds or not used in experiment 1 was not
presented in the experiment 2. Finally, the participants were asked to rate the naturalness of
generics statements in experiment 1 while they were asked how many subkinds belong to the
kind using a 7-point Likert scale. The order of blocks was counterbalanced across subjects.
Practice
1. Bunons live in cold climates. They are active mainly during the day with hunting. They
eat nuts, lizards and small rodents. Scientists have noted that bunons can vary in their
appearance (see below). They think this is because there are a number of different
kinds of bunons (for multiple subkinds condition). (However, they do not think there
are different kinds of bunons) (for no subkinds condition).

Experiment 1) Please rate how good or bad the following statement sounds as a statement
about the category described above.
Experiment 2) Do you think there are different subkinds of bunons?
a. The bunon eats nuts, lizards and small rodents.
b. A bunon eats nuts, lizards and small rodents.
c. Bunons eat nuts, lizards and small rodents.
Experiment 1) Very unnatural 1—2—3—4—5—6—7 Very natural
Experiment 2) No subkinds 1—2—3—4—5—6—7 many subkinds
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2. Loms were invented in the 1970s. They are easy to grab. They make a high-pitched
sound when people use them. Scientists have noted that loms can vary in their
appearance (see below). However, scientists do not think there are different kinds of
loms.

a. The lom makes a high-pitched sound.
b. A lom makes a high-pitched sound.
c. Loms make a high-pitched sound.

Animals
1. Daxes live in arid climates. They are nocturnal. Their average lifespan is 27 days.
Scientists have noted that daxes can vary in their appearance (see below). They think
this is because there are a number of different kinds of daxes.

d. The dax is nocturnal.
e. A dax is nocturnal.
f. Daxes are nocturnal.
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2. Tulvers are born in rivers. After 14 days from their birth, they settle down on branches
of trees until they die. They spend from 80-90% of their day asleep. Scientists have
noted that tulvers can vary in their appearance (see below). However, scientists do not
think there are different kinds of tulvers.

a. The tulver settles down on a branch of a tree until they die.
b. A tulver settles down on a branch of a tree until they die.
c. Tulvers settle down on branches of trees until they die.
3. Wurgs live in rain forest. Their diet consists mostly of insects. Their skin contains
chemicals that are poisonous. Scientists have noted that wurgs can vary in their
appearance (see below). They think this is because there are a number of different
kinds of wurgs.

a. The wurg has poisonous skin.
b. A wurg has poisonous skin.
c. Wurgs have poisonous skin.
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4. Blickets live in hot and humid climates and in coastal hills. They spend most of their time
underneath a rock. They can live for 45 days without foods. Scientists have noted that
blickets can vary in their appearance (see below). However, scientists do not think
there are different kinds of blickets.

a. The blicket spends most of its time underneath a rock.
b. A blicket spends most of its time underneath a rock.
c. Blickets spend most of their time underneath a rock.
Artifacts
1. Grestles are made by Architects. They are flexible. They are easy to use. Scientists have
noted that grestles can vary in their appearance (see below). They think this is because
there are a number of different kinds of grestles.

a. The grestle is easy to use.
b. A grestle is easy to use.
c. Grestles are easy to use.
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2. Wastorns were invented in the 1960s. They are very adaptable. They are used by
engineers. Scientists have noted that wastorns can vary in their appearance (see below).
However, scientists do not think there are different kinds of wastorns.

a. The wastorn is very adaptable.
b. A wastorn is very adaptable.
c. Wastorns are very adaptable.
3. Ploches are expensive. They are waterproof. They are heavy. Scientists have noted that
ploches can vary in their appearance (see below). They think this is because there are a
number of different kinds of ploches.

a. The ploche is expensive.
b. A ploche is expensive.
c. Ploches are expensive.
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4. Labcons are appliances that have become very popular. They can be powered by
batteries or electricity. They are also portable. Scientists have noted that labcons can
vary in their appearance (see below). However, scientists do not think there are
different kinds of labcons.

a. The labcon is portable.
b. A labcon is portable.
c. Labcons are portable.

Experiment 3 Items
Practice
1. Bunons (A/The bunon) live in burrows. They (It) are active mainly during the day with
hunting. Bunons (A/The bunon) emit sounds to attract prey.

Which picture does the description go with?
Definitely Left 1—2—3—4—5—6—7 Definitely Right
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2. Loms (A/The lom) were invented in the 1970s. It is easy to use. Loms (A/The) lome make
a high-pitched sound when people use it.

Task
1. Daxes (A/The dax) live in arid climates. Their (Its) average lifespan is 27 days. Daxes (A/The
dax) are nocturnal.
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2. Tulvers (A/The tulver) live in forests. They lay red eggs. Tulvers (A/The tulver) spend between
80-90% of their day asleep.

3. Wurgs (A/The wurg) live in forest. Their (Its) diet consists mostly of insects. Wurgs (A/The
wurg) are inactive during night.
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4. Blickets (A/The blicket) live in cool climates. Their (Its) physical functions slow down during
winter. Blickets (A/The blicket) are able to live for 45 days without food.

5. Grestle (A/The grestle) are available at most hardware stores. They (It) is adjustable. Grestle
(A/The grestle) are easy to use.

6. Wastorns (A/The wastorn) were invented in the 1960s. They (It) are very adaptable.
Wastorns (A/The wastonr) are used by engineers.
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7. Ploches (A/The ploche) are expensive. They (It) are waterproof. Ploches (A/The ploche) are
heavy.

8. Labcons (A/The labcon) are appliances that have become very popular. They (It) can be
powered by batteries or electricity. Labcons (A/The labcon) are also portable.
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